This lecture will present the different methods used for the empirical study of economics of contracts. We will present several methods that depend on the available data and the empirical questions. We will study these different approaches through examples of applications in different fields like labor, agriculture, and the regulation of public utilities. Recent developments and identification questions will be addressed carefully. We will see how the link between the theoretical models and the empirical observation can be done for estimation and testing of models of contracts under asymmetric information (moral hazard and/or adverse selection), limited commitment. The lecture will underline the methodologies that can be used for different contract models with their advantages and drawbacks. In conclusion, we will underline some interesting directions for future research.

1. Introduction
2. Structural estimation of an adverse selection model of regulation with cross-sectional data (with reference to the example of Wolak, 1994)
3. Structural estimation of a moral hazard model with panel data (with reference to Paarsch and Shearer, Dubois and Vukina)
4. Conclusion