Transaction costs are very high in political markets, and institutional organization is very relevant in the political processes. This workshop will study the institutional foundations of legislative organization of Congress from a comparative, transactional and applied perspective.

Reference Paper:

• CABALLERO, G. (2011): "Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain)" in SCHOFIELD, N. and G. CABALLERO (eds) (2011): Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting. Springer, forthcoming.

Other references (for a fuller background):

• Dixit, A. K. (1996): The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective, The MIT Press, Cambridge.
• Jones, M. P., S. Saiegh, P. T. Spiller and M. Tommasi (2002): Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, N. 3, pp. 656-669.
• North, D. C. (1990): A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2, Nº 4, pp. 355-367.
• Weingast, B. R. and W.J. Marshall (1988): The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Market?, Journal of Political Economy, 96, 132-163.